Define Moral Disagreement

Williams (1985, p. 132-133) suggests – after noticing that disagreements are not surprising – that in some contexts an agreement must be explained and that it does so in others. However, impressed by the plausibility of naturalism, many moral realists have attempted, in one way or another, to show that the moral facts to which they feel obliged are either natural facts themselves or at least appropriately consistent with such facts (Boyd 1988, Brink 1989, Railton 1986). If they are right, naturalism does not pose a particular threat to moral realism. This may be a place where argument is not simply generalized to other non-moral discourses. The argument in the texts I have just mentioned is specific to moral (or normative) discourse. Perhaps the indispensable explanation for other discourses is the only consideration that can justify a commitment to realism. If this is the case – and I have not yet seen an argument as a conclusion on this – the point of the text does not transpose into other speeches. For a similar point, see Swinburne (1976). Shafer-Landau (2003, p.

220; 2006, p. 218-221) notes that arguments of divergence can be applied in philosophy in general and in the metatheque in particular, so that there is something self-destructive about the use of this argument by the antirealist of disagreement. But Shafer-Landau does not notice that this could make the arguments of the disagreements themselves destructive in the manner described in the text. Tersman (2006, p. 112) notes that a central premise in his favorite argument of disagreement – the one he calls the idea of latitude – is for many in both philosophy and ethics. But he will go no further to discuss the concern of self-defeat that this fact could do. Non-cognitivists and error theorists have no trouble respecting naturalism while offering their respective reports on moral requirements. In both cases, their reports do not speak of what has not already been adopted by naturalism. Of course, non-coalists and error theories are divided decisively on the nature of moral thought, and non-coalists and error theorists are equally divided over versions of their favorite accounts. But they are all from the point of view of naturalism on safe ground. Tersman (2006, S.

xiii) also notes that many different arguments go under the name « disagreement argument. » Another answer, which is compatible with the first two, but which does not specifically rely on either, shifts the attention of science and mathematics and logic to the theory of knowledge itself. If one thinks of a whole series of considerations that justify a conclusion, one argues that value (although epistemic, unlike moral value) is a conclusion. Science, mathematics or logic to understand that there is a difference between good evidence and good and bad arguments is once again committed to evaluating. This raises an obvious question: under what conditions and why are epistemic claims reasonably considered justified? Whatever the answer, it will immediately provide a model for answering the parallel question of moral judgments.