Alliance Agreement Australia

It is alleged that a mechanism for resolving the blockages agreed in advance is important to allow the resolution of disputes at the ALAT level that cannot be resolved by mutual agreement. A preferred mechanism for resolving disputes in the context of an ALAT impasse is the so-called swing man process, in which an expert is appointed and each member of the alliance explains in writing how the dispute should be resolved. The expert must then decide, taking into account the principles of the alliance, which of the submissions he prefers. The expert should not impose his own separate solution. The reason for the so-called « Swing Man » is that each party is prevented from proposing an extreme decision, lest the expert prefer the other submission. It is also recognized that the presence of an independent third party will facilitate the resolution of the impasse in which all parties can live, the least of which will minimize the lingering damage to Alliance relations. It is still too early to assess the degree of use of one of the two AAPs and their relative (or otherwise) level of success in the implementation of projects under the alliance model. This is particularly the case with the current slowdown in construction activity. Despite this, the standardization of AAP is a positive step towards further growth in the use of project alliances as a model for project implementation in Australia.

The rationale for separating the project owner from both roles is generally understood and accepted. On the one hand, the owner of the project is a participant in the alliance and should normally be required to allow the alliance to achieve its objectives and allow the results of the alliance to be shared with the NOPs. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that there are certain issues for which the last word should be duly retained by the proponent. In a « pure alliance, » these issues are generally limited to the exercise of reserved powers, which are further examined below. Before comparing the approaches of the two AAPs, it is useful to briefly consider the context of the two AEPs. The publication of the National Alliance Contracting Guidelines [7] followed a 2009 study commissioned by the coffers of Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia. [8] The results of the study may not have been well received by the state coffers. One of the main results of the study was that alliance projects recorded on average an increase in the estimate of business costs to actual costs of results, in the order of 45-55%. Perhaps, in response to this finding, the principles of the National Alliance`s contractual policy, the Guide to Alliance Contracting and the NACG AAP appear to be strongly influenced by the desire for cheap value for money, and these documents adopt certain approaches that could not be considered to be consistent with the principles of a pure alliance of your kind.

These are issues that must be considered in each alliance, but it is stated that the principle of a « look-ahead » test of this type would rather be accepted by the NOPs if the outcome of the forecast test were determined either by the ALT or by a jointly appointed expert, rather than being subjectively determined by the project owner with his « customer » hat. The Alliance contract method is a relatively recent method of project preparation, which has become popular in recent decades as an alternative to traditional and other forms of relationship contracts.