The Ceasefire Agreement

Following the signing of the agreement and the sending of Russian peacekeeping forces, a memorandum was signed by the Russian and Turkish defence ministers regarding the creation of a joint Russian-Turkish observatory in Azerbaijan. [44] Russia insisted, however, that Turkey`s participation would be limited to operating on Azerbaijani soil from the Observatory and that Turkish peacekeeping forces would not go to Nagorno-Karabakh. [44] [45] The new agreement calls for the establishment of a coordination mechanism to respond to ceasefire violations, including the convening of an extraordinary meeting of the TCG by facilitating the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC). The JCCC is a group of representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the Russian-led armed formations of the DNR and NRL, charged with complying with the agreements reached by the TCG. If this coordination mechanism does not reduce fighting, the agreement authorizes retaliatory fire after the development of a military command, a public statement on these orders and communication to the TCG (OSCE SMM-Ukraine, July 23, 2020). This approach, which allows front-line units to respond to ceasefire violations, can help reduce unintended escalation, although an intentional escalation is still possible if Russia or Ukraine calculate that such an escalation is beneficial. But there are many skeptics and critics, especially among anti-Libyan factions. Tripoli`s defence minister welcomed the agreement and stressed the need for justice for war crimes, whether through Libyan and international judicial institutions. [fn] Statements by Defence Minister Salahedin Al Namroush to Libya al-Ahrar TV, broadcast on 25 October 2020. He referred to the demand of the pro-Tripoli factions to ask Haftar and his military to account for their actions during the siege of Tripoli.

In a released statement, members of the Tripoli Parliament also expressed doubts about Haftar`s compliance with the agreement, « particularly with regard to the withdrawal of mercenaries from Wagner`s troops, the Janjaweed and the Chadian opposition. » « Statement by the High Council of the State on the Ceasefire Agreement, » October 25, 2020. Hide Footnote Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists have also expressed their displeasure with the deal and said it was lamentable as a negotiating partner, which they have long refused to do. [fn] Telephone interview of the crisis group, Islamist politicians in Tripoli, 25 October 2020. Even non-Islamist politicians in Tripoli, who consider themselves « nationalists » but who share the Islamists` aversion to Haftar, have expressed similar views. Telephone interviews of the crisis group, Tripoli politicians, 24-25 October 2020. Hide Footnote They hoped instead to marginalize him and bet that without his leadership, the LNA would disintegrate over time. Under the agreement, the two belligerents pledged to exchange prisoners of war and the dead. In addition, Armenian troops were to withdraw from Armenian-occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh by 1 December.

A Russian peacekeeping force of about 2,000 Russian ground forces was to be deployed to the region for at least five years, with one of its missions being the protection of the Lachin Corridor, which connects Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region.